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Transmission errors and influence maximization in
the voter model
Markus Brede, Valerio Restocchi, Sebastian Stein
University of Southampton, Department of Electronics and Computer Science,
Southampton SO171BJ, UK
E-mail: brede.markus@gmail.com
Abstract. In this paper we analyze the effects of mistakes in opinion propagation
in the voter model on strategic influence maximization. We provide numerical results
and analytical arguments to show that generally two regimes exist for optimal opinion
control: a regime of low transmission errors in which influence maximizers should focus
on hub nodes and a large-error regime in which influence maximizers should focus on
low-degree nodes. We also develop a degree-based mean-field theory and apply it to
random networks with bimodal degree distribution, finding that analytical results for
the dependence of regimes on parameters qualitatively agree with numerical results for
scale-free networks. We generally find that the regime of optimal hub control is the
larger, the more heterogeneous the social network and the smaller the more resources
both available to the influencers.
Keywords: network dynamics, random graphs, networks, interacting agent models
1. Introduction
People often change their opinions in response to interactions with their peers or due
to new knowledge from external sources of information. Such information contagion
processes are relevant for many applications, ranging from political or government
campaigns [1], marketing [2, 3], to the understanding of radicalization [4, 5]. In many of
these contexts the question arises how an external agent with limited resources should
best allocate its influence to maximally change opinion towards some target.
The latter question is traditionally addressed in the computer science and economics
literature, mostly analyzing contagion processes related to the independent cascade
model [6, 7, 8, 9]. Whilst the problem is NP-hard the model’s simplicity and
elegance have allowed for the development of fast computer algorithms with theoretical
convergence guarantees that give good approximations for large scale social networks
[6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. However, in the independent cascade model agents are assumed
to be committed to an opinion, once they have adopted it. The model might thus be
suitable for opinion spreading processes in which agents are strongly committed to a
choice once adopted, like, e.g. buying expensive products or adopting certain life-style
choices such as smoking.
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The independent cascade model is not suitable when modeling opinion formation
without strong commitment, e.g., when deciding about voting choices in elections or
when agents can easily be swayed in their choices due to repeated influence from
differing sources on social media. The dynamics of opinion change in the latter scenario
are addressed in a rich interdisciplinary literature, cf. [16, 17] for reviews. However,
questions of influence maximization on social networks have found relatively little
attention for such dynamic models of opinion propagation. Exceptions are recent studies
considering influence maximization for the case of continuous opinions [1] or for discrete
opinions for Ising-like dynamics [18, 19, 20], a version of an AB model [21] and the
voting dynamics [22, 23, 24, 25].
Here, because of its simplicity and prominence in the literature, we focus on the
voting dynamics [26, 27], which has also been investigated in noisy settings [28]. The
main effect of including noise in the voter model is that it prevents absorbing states, so
no full consensus can be reached. Interestingly, varying trade-offs between the effects of
noisy and pressure towards consensus formation from the copying dynamics, the noisy
voter model exhibits a finite-size transition from a phase in which most of the agents
spend most of the time close to one consensus state and then switch to the other to a
phase in which two macroscopic subpopulations at different states exist [29, 30]. Recent
work has shown that this finding essentially persists when interactions are given by
complex networks [30].
Close to our work below, for the voting dynamics a large body of work has
investigated effects of so-called zealotry on consensus formation [31, 32, 33]. Similar
to what we call influencers below, zealots are agents that are less likely to change their
opinions and thus they can exert substantial influence on the population. The effects of
zealots has recently also been investigated in the noisy voter model for the mean-field
scenario of all-to-all coupled populations [34]. However, literature on zealotry typically
does not focus on the optimal allocation of a zealot’s influence, and thus addresses a
slightly different problem from the problem of influence maximization outlined below.
However, recent work has also started to gain insights into optimal opinion control in the
voting dynamics. Specifically, [22, 24, 25] have pointed out that heuristics targeting hub
nodes perform very well on undirected heterogeneous networks, even though heuristics
based on centrality metrics do not correspond to exactly optimal allocations for all types
of networks [22]. This picture has been qualified by some of our recent work which has
shown that targeting hub nodes is not necessarily optimal in all situations, e.g., not if
agents have a large propensity to resist influence [35] or if time horizons of the influence
maximizer are very short [36].
In the voting dynamics agents repeatedly adopt opinions of randomly selected
neighbors. However, in real-world situations communication is often noisy, and we
might not always correctly interpret a neighbor’s choice or intention (or may be swayed
by a variety of influences extrinsic to the system when making up our minds). Such
a scenario of communication with frequently occurring misunderstandings might be
particularly applicable in humanitarian situations [37]. Communication in such noisy
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settings has previously been modeled in the so-called Kirman or noisy voter model
[38, 28], but up to our best knowledge influence maximization has not yet been studied
in the context of the noisy voter model.
Whilst strategies for optimal influence enhancement have been analyzed in various
settings for the voting dynamics [22, 23, 24, 25], the effects of randomly occurring
mistakes when adopting opinions on optimal allocation of external control have only
found very limited attention. The only study in this domain is [20] who develop a
gradient ascent algorithm based on mean-field solutions to study the role of noise in the
Glauber dynamics for opinion formation. The authors of [20] find that targeting hub
nodes is optimal in high noise scenarios while low-degree nodes should be targeted when
noise is low.
Here we extend previous work on opinion control by investigating strategies for
optimal influence allocation in the voting dynamics when opinion updating is subject
to randomly occurring mistakes. Below, we extend the framework developed by [25] to
this scenario and give guidelines how optimal allocation strategies have to be modified
depending on the amount of uncertainty in communication.
Our approach to this problem is as follows. We first develop a numerical framework
to estimate vote shares in the stochastic dynamics of the voter model via stationary
solutions of the master equation. We then use optimization techniques to gain insights
into optimal allocations, and develop an analytical understanding of the results via
a degree-based mean-field theory. We also use these insights as the basis of testing
heuristics which can easily scale to large-scale systems.
2. Model
Consider a set of N voters who each hold an opinion si ∈ {A,B}, i = 1, ...N . Agents
are connected by a social network given by its adjacency matrix G = {aij}Ni=1 which we
assume to be symmetric and unweighted. Additionally, two influencers (or controllers)
A (who holds opinion A) and B (who holds opinion B) are considered. Both can exert
unidirectional influence on the N votes. This influencing is modeled through vectors ~pA
and ~pB with pA,i = 1 (or pB,i = 1) if A (or B) exert influence on node i and pA,i = 0
(or pB,i = 0) otherwise. Note, that influence is thus modeled as a binary variable and
–somewhat different to some approaches considering zealots [31]– the influencer is not
subject to influence from the social system comprised of the N voters. Below we will
always assume that A is active or strategic in the sense that A aims to allocate her
influence with an aim to optimize her vote share in the steady state. In contrast, if
present, B is considered passive in the sense of allocating her influence randomly.
Given some influence allocation ~pA and ~pB of the influencers we then proceed with
the voter dynamics with transmission errors by iterating the following steps. (i) A
randomly chosen focus agent selects a randomly chosen in-neighbor (which includes
the controllers). (ii) The agent adopts the opinion of this in-neighbor with probability
1− q and adopts the opposite opinion in the other case. The probability q thus models
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‘transmission errors’, i.e. with probability q the message to follow an opinion is corrupted
during transmission from the chosen in-neighbor to the focus agent. Steps (i) and (ii)
are then iterated until a stochastic equilibrium is reached.
It is immediately obvious that for q = 0 the above model reduces to the traditional
voter dynamics. However, it is worth commenting that our setup differs slightly
from the traditional noisy voter model of [28] in which flip rates from states are
augmented by a neighbour-independent probability additional to the ratios of neighbours
of opposite states. The model as introduced above is meant to more explicitly model
miscommunication as a source of noise, but could be mapped to the model of [28] with
node-specific probabilities for state changes.
Note, that provided the social network is connected, for q = 0 the voting dynamics
will always reach a consensus in finite networks [16]. For any q > 0 it is known that
the noisy voter model is exponentially ergodic and an equilibrium state with certain
fractions of voters adopting A and B votes will be reached. Importantly, other work on
‘opinion control’ in the voter model has assumed the presence of two influencing parties
[25]. Without noise, such a choice is necessary because otherwise one opinion would
become extinct. Here, the presence of transmission errors ensures the presence of an
entropic force that always guarantees a mixed equilibrium and thus we can also consider
settings of ~pB = 0.
The voting dynamics allows for analytical treatment [16]. Here we follow the
approach of [25] and analyze it via mean-field rate equations for probability flows.
Whilst the approach is a standard technique often used in this context, it is worth-
while bearing in mind that this involves an uncontrolled approximation that essentially
ignores fluctuations, see, e.g. [39] for a more detailed discussion. Assume that xi gives
the probability of node i being in state A. We then have
dxi
dt
= (1− xi)
(
(1− q)(∑j aijxj + pA,i)∑
j aij + pA,i + pB,i
+
q(
∑
j aij(1− xj) + pB,i)∑
j aij + pA,i + pB,i
)
−
− xi
(
(1− q)(∑j aij(1− xj) + pB,i)∑
j aij + pA,i + pB,i
+
q(
∑
j aijxj + pA,i)∑
j aij + pA,i + pB,i
)
. (1)
The terms in Eq. (1) correspond to probabilities of the focus agent chosen being of type
B (top line) or A (bottom line) and then reflect probabilities of conversions according
to the voting dynamics. For example, with the first term at the top line events in which
a B is chosen as focus agent which will select an agent of type A as in-neighbor and
correctly adopt its opinion state is modeled. With the second term on the top line an
event in which a B chooses a B-agent to copy, but mistakes B’s state and (mistakenly)
adopts opinion A is described; analogous arguments lead to the terms at the bottom
line. Here we are interested in stationary states of the opinion dynamics and hence
set dxi/dt = 0 for all i. After some simplification a linear equation for steady-state
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probabilities ~x∗ results
(diag(pA,i + pB,i + ki)− (1− 2q)G)~x∗ = (1− q)~pA + q~pB + q~k, (2)
where ki =
∑
j aji and diag(pA,i + pB,i + ki) gives a zero matrix with diagonal entries
pA,i+pB,i+ki. Note, that for q = 0 Eq. (2) reproduces Eq. (4) in [25]. The stationarity
condition (2) gives a system of linear equation. Finding solutions to this system will
allow us to optimize configurations of exerted influence below.
Before proceeding, we note that one can immediately read mean-field results for
stationary vote shares for all-to-all connected networks from Eq. (2). Defining the
average share of A opinions in the network by X∗ = 1/N
∑
i x
∗
i we have
X∗(pA, pB) =
(1− q)pA + qpB + q
pA + pB + 2q
, (3)
where pA = 1/N
∑
i pA,i and pB = 1/N
∑
i pB,i are the respective densities of influencers
A and B. There is, of course, no point in influence maximization for an all-to-all
connected network, but Eq. (3) confirms our intuition about the role of transmission
noise. For q = 0 results reproduce results of [25], and for q = 1/2 we find X∗ = 1/2
irrespective of pA and pB.
Similar to what was noted by Masuda [25] for the case without noise, we note that
(2) is diagonally dominant for all q and thus, for shorter computation times for large
networks, we can solve it by Jacobi iteration, starting, e.g., with x
(0)
i = 1/2, i = 1, ..., N
and then iterate
x
(n+1)
i =
(1− q)pA,i + qpB,i + qki + (1− 2q)
∑
j ajix
(n)
i
ki + pA,i + pB,i
(4)
until convergence.
To obtain influence maximizing configurations we proceed as follows. First,
undirected unweighted social networks are constructed using the configuration model
[40] for power law degree distributions P (k) ∝ k−α where we typically consider α = 3
in most numerical experiments below. More or less heterogeneous networks can be
constructed by choosing smaller or larger values of the exponent α and adjusting
proportionality constants to keep connectivities constant. In this procedure, multiple
connections and self-connections are prevented and it is ensured that the resulting
networks are connected. Next, for given influence resources nA =
∑
i pA,i and nB =∑
i pB,i we allocate the influenced nodes by choosing nA and nB of the N nodes of the
social network at random. Next, optimization of the influence of A from one randomly
chosen influenced node i with pA,i = 1 to another randomly chosen not yet influenced
node j with pA,j = 0 takes place if X
∗(pA,i = 1, pA,j = 0) < X∗(pA,i = 0, pA,j = 1).
Influence reallocation according to stochastic hill-climbing is repeated until no further
improvements have been found in the last 10N attempts.
In the above we have assumed that also the influence of controllers is subject to
transmission errors. For comparison we have also considered a scenario where opinions
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Figure 1. Dependence of vote share gains achievable by optimizing influence
allocations ~pA for influencer A on the influencer’s total resource nA for different
amounts of transmission noise q. (a) Gains for A without a passive influencer B.
(b) Gains for A against a passive influencer B with nB = 100. Results are for scale-
free networks with α = 3 of size N = 1000 with average degree 〈k〉 = 3. Data
points represent averages over 50 network realizations and error bars are smaller or
comparable to the size of symbols.
from the external influencer are always understood correctly. In that case Eq. (4) needs
to be modified by omitting the pre-factor 1 − q to pA,i and the pre-factor q to pB,i
on the right hand side. Results for both scenarios are essentially the same with small
differences in numerical values for large nA and nB. To avoid unnecessary duplication
we only present results for the first scenario.
3. Results
In this section we first present numerical results that illustrate a clear dependence
of strategic influence allocation on heterogeneous complex networks on settings for
transmission noise in subsection 3.1. Numerical results are complemented by analytical
solutions for an illustrative network model in subsection 3.2, which clarifies the main
observation of Sec. 3.1 and provides theoretical understanding.
3.1. Numerical Results
We first present results from numerical optimization in Fig. 1 which shows the
dependence of influence gains achieved by optimization X∗opt/X
∗
rand − 1 on the budgets
of the active and passive influencer for various amounts of transmission noise q. Several
observations can be made. First, it is apparent that influence maximization can
achieve larger gains in systems with low amounts of noise, whereas gains in very noisy
systems are limited to single digit percentages. Gains also strongly depend on resource
allocations to the competing influencer, i.e. acting against a well-resourced passive
influencer a strategic influencer can generally improve outcomes by a far larger amount
than when competing against a resource-poor opponent, when A’s aim is essentially to
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Figure 2. Strategic allocations of influence for different settings of the transmission
error. (a) Dependence of likelihood of a node to be influenced by A on its degree
k. (b) Dependence of average degree and (c) standard deviation of the distribution
of influenced nodes in the optimal allocation 〈k〉controlled on transmission noise q.
Parameters are α = 3, N = 1000, 〈k〉 = 3, nA = 10, and nB = 0 and data points
represent averages over 50 runs. Note that for each setting of q optimizations have
been performed for the same 50 networks.
dampen noise. Optimization gains also typically exhibit a maximum depending on A’s
resource endowment and the location of this maximum shows a clear dependence on
transmission noise q. Generally we find that increasing q tends to shift the maximum
towards larger nA. Thus, in low noise settings strategic allocation matters most when
resources of the active planner are small (e.g. nA = 1 in Fig. 1a for q = 10
−4), but
for the largest noise setting of q = 1 strategic allocation gives largest gains for large
resource endowments (e.g. nA ≈ 400 in Fig. 1a for q = 10−1). Results of these initial
experiments thus clearly indicate major differences in influence maximization in the
voter model with and without transmission noise.
To further understand the importance of transmission noise for strategic allocation
we next constructed optimal allocations for different settings of q. We then quantify
optimized allocations via the likelihoods of nodes to be influenced depending on their
degree, i.e. the ratio nk,controlled/nk (where nk, nk,controlled are the number of nodes
with degree k and the number of controlled nodes with degree k) and the distribution
of influenced degrees. For the latter, two measures are of interest, e.g. the average
controlled degree
kcontrolled = 1/nA
∑
i
pA,iki (5)
and the standard deviation of controlled degrees
σ2k,controlled = 1/nA
∑
i
pA,i(ki − kcontrolled)2. (6)
The respective numerical experiments are illustrated in Fig. 2. Panel (a) shows the
probability of nodes to be influenced depending on degree for low and high transmission
error settings. For low error rate q = 0.01 the dependency is step like with all nodes
with degree larger than k ≈ 20 being subject to influence and all other nodes remaining
uncontrolled. Thus clearly, for low transmission noise strategic influencers should almost
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Figure 3. Comparison of performance of low and high degree heuristics relative to
optimal allocations for settings with relatively low (left, q = 0.01), larger (middle,
q = 0.1) and large (right, q = 0.25) transmission error probabilities. Parameters are
α = 3, N = 1000, 〈k〉 = 3, nA = 10, and nB = 0 and data points represent averages
over 50 runs.
exclusively target the highest degree nodes, which agrees with previous findings in the
literature for the setting without noise [25]. As the error rate is increased this heuristic
breaks down with a mixture of high and low degree nodes being targeted for q = 0.06,
a focus on intermediate degree control for q = 0.08 and almost exclusive control of the
lowest degree leaf nodes for q = 0.25. By showing the dependence of controlled degrees
on q Fig. 2b reinforces this point. We observe a clear transition between a high-degree
and low-degree control regime. In fact, exact transition points can easily be determined
by plots of the standard deviation of the distribution of controlled degrees vs. the error
probability q, cf. Fig. 2c, where we see a very sharp drop in the standard deviation of
the distribution of controlled degrees when increasing q beyond the low-noise regime. As
suggested in Fig. 2a the plot also confirms that the switch between exclusive hub control
to leaf node control is not immediate. Instead, in between both phases we find a region
of parameter space at approximately 0.07 < q < 0.25 in which σ2k,controlled is small, but
does not vanish, corresponding to a situation where controlling nodes of intermediate
and gradually declining degree maximizes vote shares.
The existence of separate low- and high-error regimes points out that heuristics
based on high degree or centrality scores do not always fare best when considering
opinion control in the voter model. In Fig. 3 we illustrate this point by comparing the
relative under-performance X∗heuristic/X
∗
opt of degree-based heuristics relative to optimal
configurations. More specifically, we compare random allocations and low- and high-
degree heuristics based on controlling the nA highest or lowest degree nodes (and
randomly choosing controlled nodes in case of degree ties). In agreement with [25],
on undirected networks high-degree heuristics perform very well. However, note that
(as also pointed out in [22]) exclusively controlling high-degree nodes does not always
achieve optimal performance. For low error probability, controlling low-degree nodes in
all settings proves inferior to controlling hub nodes. For high-error settings the exactly
opposite result is observed, i.e. the low-degree heuristic leads to results very close to
optimal, followed by random allocations and the high-degree protocol always performs
worst. For the intermediate setting differences between the three protocols are subtle
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Figure 4. Dependence of the noise threshold that separates high- and low-degree
control on agent resources. Open boxes give the dependence on the resource of the
active influencer A when nB = 0. Filled boxes give the dependence on the resource of
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points and errors estimated from plots of σk,controlled vs. q.
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Figure 5. Dependence of the noise threshold on network heterogeneity measured by
α. Parameters are α = 3, N = 1000, 〈k〉 = 3, nA = 10, nB = 0, and data points and
errors estimated from plots of σk,controlled vs. q.
and depend on resource endowments.
Our above result points out that simple degree-based heuristics can work reasonably
well on heterogeneous networks, but require at least approximate knowledge about the
error probability-control regime which applies in the system under investigation. To
develop better intuition for this case we proceed by investigating the dependence of
the low-high degree threshold qthresh on resource allocations to the influencers and the
network structure. As a good proxy for the threshold we use the level of noise at which
the sharp drop in standard deviation of the distribution of controlled degrees is found
(cf. Fig. 2c). We start by analyzing the dependence of the threshold on the resources
nA and nB at the disposal of the active and the passive influencer, cf. Fig. 4. We
consider two scenarios. In the first setting, we fix nB = 0 and vary the resource nA
of A (open boxes in Fig. 4). In the second, we fix nA = 10 and consider competition
against an opponent B with varying resource nB (filled boxes in Fig. 4). For both
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settings a non-linear dependence of qthresh and the respective resource endowments with
a tendency for markedly lower thresholds the larger the resource budgets is observed.
In Fig. 5 we also investigate a setting in which we systematically vary network
structure from very heterogeneous networks with scaling exponent α = 2 up to more
and more homogeneous networks as α is increased. Again, a clear dependence of the
threshold on α is observed with values saturating at around qthresh ≈ 0.065 in the limit
of regular networks. Thus, the more heterogeneous a network, the larger its high-degree
control regime.
Both of our findings above give rough guidelines for selecting appropriate heuristics
when some knowledge about the social network and opponent budgets is available.
Roughly, the more resource available to the opponent and to the optimizer, the lower
the noise threshold and the less appropriate hub-focused strategies are. Contrariwise,
the more heterogeneous the social network, the larger the regime in which hub-control
applies.
3.2. Degree-based mean-field theory
In the following we aim for an analytical understanding of the switch between optimal
low- and high-degree control depending on the rate of transmission errors. For this
purpose we approximate the voting dynamics with influence using a mean-field approach
which will then allow us to find analytical expressions for optimal vote shares. We start
with Eq. (2) which gives stationary vote shares of individual nodes and then group
nodes according to degree k and whether they receive influence of strength one from A
or not, which leaves us with 2k groups of nodes which we label x
(0)
k (for nodes of degree
k which are not influenced by A) and x
(1)
k (for nodes which are influenced by A). For
simplicity we don’t explicitly model groups of nodes influenced by B or not, but assume
that all nodes receive influence from B of average strength pB,k = nB/N for all k. Then,
introducing the shortcuts ∆
(0)
k = k + pB and ∆
(1)
k = 1 + k + pB and approximating∑
j aijxj ≈ k〈x〉, we obtain:
∆
(0)
k x
(0)
k = qk + (1− 2q)k〈x〉+ qpB, (7)
∆
(1)
k x
(1)
k = 1− q + qk + (1− 2q)k〈x〉+ qpB. (8)
The mean field at the end of a randomly chosen link is
〈x〉 =
∑
k
khk
〈k〉
(
rkx
(1)
k + (1− rk)x(0)k
)
, (9)
where hk is the fraction of nodes with degree k and rk gives the fraction of the nodes
with degree k which are influenced by A.
Combining Eq.s (7) and (9) we obtain a self-consistency relation
〈x〉 =
∑
k
khk
〈k〉 rk
1− q + qk + qpB + (1− 2q)k〈x〉
∆
(1)
k k
+ (1− rk)qk + qpB + (1− 2q)k〈x〉
∆
(0)
k
(10)
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which allows to solve for the mean-field
〈x〉 =
∑
k
khk
〈k〉
(
rk
1−q+qk+qpB
∆
(1)
k k
+ (1− rk) qk+qpB
∆
(0)
k
)
1−∑k k2hk〈k〉 (1− 2q)(rk/∆(1)k + (1− rk)/∆(0)) . (11)
Equation (11) can now be used to find vote shares x
(0)
k and x
(1)
k for nodes with degree k
via Eq. (7), which then gives an expression for the overall vote share
X =
∑
k
hk(rkx
(1)
k + (1− rk)x(0)k ). (12)
We next seek to find influence allocations rk that maximize X for given budget
nA = N
∑
k hkrk, given degree distribution hk, and given rate of transmission errors
q. Inspection of Eq. (12) with all substituted indirect dependencies shows that
general expression for optimality quickly become extremely unwieldy. So, instead of
proceeding with an analysis of general network structures, we restrict further analysis
to a minimal network model, composed of a random network of equal fractions of hub
nodes (with degree k1 > k2) and periphery nodes with degree k2, so that the average
degree is 〈k〉 = (k1 + k2)/2. This simple network model is only a crude abstraction for
heterogeneous complex networks, but allows to gain basic insights into optimal influence
allocation to periphery and hub nodes.
For the above example, we can now evaluate Eq. (11) and obtain 〈x〉 = B/(1−A)
with
A =
1− 2q
2〈k〉
(
rk1k
2
1/∆
(1)
k1
+ (1− rk1)k21/∆(0)k1 + rk2k22/∆
(1)
k2
+ (1− rk2)k22/∆(0)k2
)
(13)
and
B =
1
2〈k〉
(
k1rk1
1− q + qk1 + qpB
∆
(1)
k1
+ k1(1− rk1)
qk1 + qpB
∆
(0)
k1
)
+
+
1
2〈k〉
(
k2rk2
1− q + qk2 + qpB
∆
(1)
k2
+ k2(1− rk2)
qk2 + qpB
∆
(0)
k2
)
. (14)
Overall, we thus obtain
X =
rk1
2
1− q + qk1 + qpB + (1− 2q)k1 B1−A
k1 + pB + 1
+
1− rk1
2
qk1 + qpB + (1− 2q) B1−A
k1 + pB
+
+
rk2
2
1− q + qk2 + qpB + (1− 2q)k2 B1−A
k2 + pB + 1
+
1− rk2
2
qk2 + qpB + (1− 2q) B1−A
k2 + pB
. (15)
As we aim to divide a constant budget nA between equal numbers of hub and
periphery nodes we assume that a fraction rk1 = snA/N of the hub nodes and a fraction
rk2 = (1 − s)nA/N of the periphery nodes are influenced, so that varying 0 ≤ s ≤ 1
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Figure 6. (a) Dependence of relative vote share X(s)/X(s = 0) on the fraction of
influenced hub nodes for a scenario of low transmission errors q = 0.001 and a scenario
of high transmission errors q = 0.25. (b) Dependence of vote shares on transmission
error rates q for an allocation in which all influence is assigned to hub nodes (s = 1), and
an allocation of all influence to periphery nodes (s = 0). (c) Dependence of optimal
fraction of influenced hub nodes on the error rate q for nA = 1. Curves represent
mean-field results based on Eq. (15) calculated for k1 = 100, k2 = 1, nA = N/2, and
nB = 0.
allows us to interpolate between pure hub and pure periphery influence. Further, varying
the fraction of overall influenced nodes nA allows for a qualitative comparison with
numerical results presented in Fig. 4 above. Substituting the corresponding terms into
Eq. (15) gives an expression X(k1, k2, nA, nB, s, q) that allows to compute vote shares
as a function of all relevant parameters.
Using the expression just obtained for a concrete example network with k1 = 100
and k2 = 1 we illustrate the dependence of relative vote shares on the fraction of
influenced hub nodes in panel (a) of Figure 6 for very low and large settings for
transmission errors. Consistent with our earlier numerical results we clearly see that
for large amounts of noise, the largest influence is obtained for s = 0, i.e. an exclusive
allocation of all influence to periphery nodes. Contrariwise, for a low amount of errors,
best vote shares can be obtained when most influence is allocated to hub nodes. Further
results that show the dependence of vote shares obtainable for exclusive hub (s = 1) and
exclusive periphery (s = 0) allocations on the amount of transmission noise are given
in panel (b) of Fig. 6. Again, as observed in numerical optimization results in Sec.
3.1, we see a crossover from a low error regime in which hub allocation is optimal to a
large error regime in which periphery allocation is best. Equation (15) also allows for a
straightforward analytical derivation of an optimality condition and in panel (c) of Fig.
6 we also show the dependence of the optimal fraction of influenced hub nodes on q.
In contrast to observations in the numerical optimization for scale-free networks above,
results indicate an abrupt change from a regime of exclusive hub control to a regime of
exclusive periphery control. The absence of a larger transition region in which a mix of
high and low degree nodes is best likely is an artifact of the mean-field approximation
which ignores differences in centrality between nodes.
Based on the observation that the transition between hub and periphery control
is typically sharp, one can find good approximations for the dependence of the
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Figure 7. (a) Dependence of crossover point qthresh between hub control to periphery
control on the amount of resource nA available to controller A for nB = 0. (b)
Dependence of crossover point qthresh between hub control to periphery control on
the amount of resource nB available to controller B for nA = 1. Settings are
k1 = 20, k2 = 5.
transition point on various parameters by evaluating X(k1, k2, nA, nB, s = 1, qthresh) =
X(k1, k2, nA, nB, s = 0, qthresh). Solutions of the resulting cubic equation are again
involved and we only report illustrative results in Fig. 7. Panel (a) of Fig. 7 gives
the dependence of qthresh on the amount of resource available to controller A. As in the
numerical optimization (cf. Fig. 4 – curve qthresh(nA, nB = 0)) we see that thresholds
are generally lower the larger nA. In a similar vein, Fig. 7(b) reports the dependence
on nB for fixed nA = N/2. Again, consistent with Fig. 4 in subsection 3.1 we find a
decline in qthresh with increasing resource availability for nB.
4. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of noise in the form of randomly occurring
misunderstandings in the voting dynamics on influence maximization. As one might
expect, our results in the mean-field approximation and in numerical evaluation point
out that networks become the more difficult to influence, the larger the probability of
misunderstandings. Further, extensive numerical results for heterogeneous undirected
networks combined with an analytical understanding obtained from a degree-based
mean-field analysis point out that optimal allocation strategies will generally be different
in low- and high noise-regimes which tend to be separated by a sharp transition. For
low noise, we have shown that highest-degree heuristics give close to optimal allocations,
while for high noise, lowest-degree heuristics give allocations within less than 0.5% off
the optimum.
Interestingly, our findings in the dynamic setting of the voter model are in agreement
with recent findings for optimal allocations in complex contagion dynamics [41]. In both
situations it is found that nodes are the more difficult to control, the higher their degree.
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In complex contagion this is the case in the beginning of cascades, when not enough
activated neighbors are available to ‘convince’ them. In the voting dynamics with noise,
nodes are exposed to the more potentially contradicting opinions the larger their degree,
and thus the more difficult to influence the larger their degree.
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